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Abstract
We use recent unconditional quantile regression methods (UQR) to study the 
distributive effects of education in Argentina. Standard methods usually focus 
on mean effects, or explore distributive effects by either making stringent 
modeling assumptions, and/or through counter- factual decompositions 
that require several temporal observations. An empirical case shows the 
flexibility and usefulness of UQR methods. Our application for the case of 
Argentina shows that education contributed positively to increased inequality 
in Argentina, mostly due to the effect of strongly heterogeneous effects of 
education on earnings.
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Resumen
A través de la utilización del método de regresiones por cuantiles no 
condicionados (UQR) estudiamos los efectos distributivos de la educación 
en Argentina. Los métodos estándar usualmente se focalizan en los efectos 
sobre la media, o exploran efectos distributivos, ya sea imponiendo supuestos 
restrictivos para la modelización y/o a través de descomposiciones contra 
factuales que requieren una cantidad importante de observaciones temporales. 
Desde un punto de vista empírico se ha demostrado la flexibilidad y utilidad 
de los métodos UQR. Nuestra aplicación empírica para el caso de Argentina 
muestra que la educación ha contribuido positivamente a aumentar la 
desigualdad en Argentina. En mayor medida, esto se debe al gran efecto 
heterogéneo que tiene la educación sobre los ingresos.
Palabras clave: Regresión por cuantiles no condicionados, desigualdad del 
ingreso, educación, Argentina.
Clasificación JEL: C21, I24, I31, D3.
1. INTRODUCTION
Fostering education is widely perceived as a powerful policy measure to improve 
the welfare of any society, through its direct impact on enhancing personal productivity 
and earnings, and as a way to equalize opportunities and, hopefully, improving the 
distribution of income.
The massive literature on returns to education focuses mostly on the first issue, 
that is, on the impact of education on expected earnings. In spite of the enormous 
methodological difficulties in providing clean, consistent estimates of this causal 
effect, there is wide agreement that education has an economically significant impact 
on expected personal earnings. See Card (2001) for a review of this literature.
The second issue –the distributive effects of increased education– has received less 
attention. The effects of education on distributional features, like earnings inequality, 
depend not only on the returns to education, but also on the initial distribution of 
education and other population characteristics, and on how changes in education are 
translated into changes in the distribution of incomes, and then on inequality.
The literature on quantile regressions that dates back to Buchinsky (1994)’s seminal 
study, reveals an important empirical result: increased education has the double effect 
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of augmenting expected earnings while increasing the dispersion of earnings for each 
level of education. That is, more educated groups face a (conditional) distribution of 
earnings that is shifted to the right but also more disperse. Consequently, this literature 
suggests a dual effect of education that may imply a policy trade-off: more education 
increases both expected earnings and the within-group dispersion of earnings for each 
level of education. Martins and Pereira (2004) carefully documented this effect for 
a sample of 16 European countries, suggesting that this undesirable effect, through 
increased within-group earnings dispersion, may harm the role of education as a tool 
to improve income inequality.
Though quantile regression is a powerful tool to explore the effects of education 
on the conditional distribution of earnings, it is important to remark that the interest 
lies in the way education alters the unconditional distribution. The fact that education 
leads to a more disperse conditional distribution of earnings does not necessarily 
mean that the unconditional distribution would be more disperse. The latter can be 
seen as the product of the conditional distribution of earnings (on education) and the 
marginal distribution of education. Hence, the effect of increased education ultimately 
depends on both, the interaction between the conditional distribution of earnings, and 
the marginal distribution of education.
From this perspective, the quantile regression result that suggests increased within 
dispersion in the conditional distribution, albeit a very important one should be seen 
as an intermediate step, towards the final goal of assessing the impact of education 
on the unconditional distribution of earnings.
The step from conditional to unconditional distributive effects is not a trivial one, 
and only recently there are available specific statistical tools to study them. The still 
infant but rapidly growing literature on unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo, 
Fortin, and Lemieux (2009)) based on the concept of the recentered influence function, 
seems to provide a natural and important step towards this goal.
This paper uses unconditional quantile and recentered influence function 
regressions to explore the effects of increased education on unconditional income 
inequality. The final goal is to explore whether education indeed has an undesirable 
effect on inequality, as advanced by studies like that of Martins and Pereira (2004), 
focused on within group effects. Hence, this study complements quantile regression 
based results by extending the effect of education beyond that on the conditional 
distribution.
The case of Argentina provides relevant variability for this study, not found in other 
countries. During the nineties, sustained improvements in educational achievements 
occurred simultaneously with a dramatic deterioration in inequality. After the drastic 
crisis of 2002, both, education and inequality, improved. Consistently, Argentina is 
a case where both education and inequality moved markedly, providing important 
sampling variability to study the distributive effects of education.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the literature on 
conditional and unconditional quantile regression. In Section 3 we provide our empirical 
application to the case of Argentina. Finally Section 4 collects the main conclusions 
and lines for future research.
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2. STANDARD, CONDITIONAL, AND UNCONDITIONAL QUANTILE 
 REGRESSIONS
Standard regression models are useful tools when the interest lies in measuring 
the effect of a covariate on the expected value of the variable of interest. Only under 
very stringent assumptions such model can be used to extrapolate the effects to other 
aspects of the distribution of the variable of interest, such as its quantiles, its variance, 
or its level of inequality as measured by a standard index, like the Gini coefficient.
In our context, the goal is to measure the effect of changes in educational levels 
on the distribution of income. As a first step, and for analytic convenience and in 
accordance with the natural notion of a derivative, by movements in educational levels 
we mean small changes in the location of the distribution of education.
Our target will be some functional of the distribution of income other than the 
mean, like any quantile, the variance, or its Gini coefficient. In this sense, standard 
regression analysis focuses on the impact of education on one particular functional 
(the mean).
In a recent article, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) propose unconditional 
quantile regressions as a simple way to estimate the effects of increasing education 
on the quantiles of the unconditional distribution of a variable. In what follows we 
present the main ideas, and refer to these authors for further details.
Let Y be a random variable with cumulative distribution function (CDF) FY(y), 
and let ν(FY) be any functional. For simplicity, we will focus on linear functional that 
can be expressed as
 F y dF yY Yν ψ( ) ( ) ( )= ∫  (1)
for some function ψ (y). For example, the mean, μY, corresponds to ψ (y) = y. (Appendix 
A contains some details of how to construct the Influence Function).
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009), define the ‘recentered influence function’ 
(RIF) as
 RIF y IF y F y( , ) ( , ) ( ) ,Yν ν ν ψ ( )≡ + =  (2)
and, trivially,
 
E RIF y F[ , ] Yν ν ( )( ) =  (3)
This is an important step, since, it implies that any functional of interest can be 
expressed as an expected value.
In order to incorporate the effect of covariates, let X be a vector of random 
variables. Note that, using the law of iterated expectations,
 F RIF y dF y E RIF Y X x dF x( , )  [ ( , ) | ]Y Y Xν ν ν( ) ( ) ( )= ∫ = ∫ =  (4)
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where FX (x) is the marginal CDF of X. Suppose the distribution of X changes as a small 
location shift, and let α(ν) be the vector of partial effects of moving each coordinate 
of X separately as a location shift. Assume also that the conditional distribution of 
Y given X stays constant. Then, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) show that the 
‘unconditional partial effect on’ ν(F) of altering the CDF of X in such way is given by:
 ∫α ν ν[ ]= =dE RIF y X xdx dF x( ) ( , ) ( )x  (5)
In words, this means that the partial effects of altering shifting the CDF of X 
to the right (marginally) can be recovered by simple regression methods, that is, by 
regressing the RIF of Y with respect of the functional of interest, on the vector X (the 
‘RIF regression’), compute the marginal effects, and then integrate over the values 
of X, as in standard regression analysis.
A relevant application for our case corresponds to the effects of X on the unconditional 
quantiles of Y. Let now ν(FY) = qτ denote the τ−th quantile of FY (·). Its recentered 
influence function can be shown to be given by (Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009)).
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where c1,τ ≡ 1 / fY (qτ ) and c2,τ ≡ qτ − c1,τ · (1 − τ). Therefore
 
E RIF y q X x c E I Y q X x c
c I Y q X x c
[ ( , ) | ] [ ( ) | ]
Pr[ ( ) | ]
1, 2,
1, 2,
= = > = +
= > = +
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 (7)
This last expression is the unconditional quantile regression, that is, a regression 
model that links the expected value of the quantiles (as measured by the RIF) to 
covariates. Particular specifications on Pr[Y>qτ | X = x] lead to alternative regressions. 
We use linear probability model for estimation (see Appendix B for further details).
In practice, in a first step the RIF is estimated by replacing all unknown quantities 
by their observable counterparts. In this case, unknown quantities are qτ and fY (qτ), 
which are estimated by the sample τ−th quantile of Y, and a standard nonparametric 
density estimator (e.g. kernel), respectively. The second stage regresses the estimated 
RIF on x using a standard OLS estimator.
Some remarks on this strategy are the following. First, the linear probability 
assumption may sound restrictive. Replacing it by a standard probit or logit specification 
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can be easily implemented. Nevertheless, the empirical results of Firpo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux (2009) indicate that results are almost indistinguishable of those using the 
linear probability model, much in accordance to the recent literature that favors it 
in light of its conceptual and computational advantages, as clearly advocated by 
Angrist and Pischke (2008)1. Second, (asymptotic) inference in the second stage 
must accommodate the fact that qτ and fY (qτ) are estimated in a first stage. This is 
discussed in detail in Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). Finally, RIF regressions for 
other functional of interest can be derived. For example, if the functional of interest 
is the mean, then the RIF of Y for the mean is simply y, then, as expected, the RIF 
regression is the standard regression. In our case, we will be interested in the RIF 
regression for the Gini coefficient, derived in Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). See 
Appendix C for further details.
Finally, it is relevant to compare unconditional quantile regression with standard 
quantile regressions, as defined originally by Koenker and Basset (1978). The linear 
quantile regression model specifies
 Q x x( , ) ' ( )Y X| τ β τ=  (8)
where Q
Y|X
(τ ) denotes the τ−th quantile of the conditional distribution of Y given 
X = x. Consequently
 Q x
x
( )
( , )Y X|β τ τ= ∂ ∂  (9)
that is, the elements of β (τ ) measure the effect of altering the components of x 
marginally, on the τ−th quantile of the conditional distribution of Y on X. In this model, 
β (τ ) is understood as a non-specified function of τ, hence its semiparametric nature.
In this context, the standard result (mentioned in the Introduction) that for the 
case of education, β (τ) is a positive and monotonically increasing function means that 
increasing education impacts more in higher quantiles of the conditional distribution 
of income, that is, by increasing education, all conditional quantiles move up, but 
at an increasing rate along quantiles. This effect is clearly and naturally captured by 
quantile regressions, as documented by Martins and Pereira (2004).
Nevertheless, the effect on the unconditional distribution (the subject of interest 
of distributive analysis) requires ‘averaging’ these effects according to the levels of 
education observed in the sample. In intuitive terms, if the distribution of Y can be 
thought as factored by its conditional distribution given X, and the marginal distribution 
of X, then inequality in Y represents the interaction of the inequality in X and the 
way Y is affected by X. Conditional quantile regressions can be seen as modeling 
the second channel, whereas unconditional quantile regressions integrate both. For 
1 The use of OLS as a regression method is just a lineal approximation to the true model and thus it is 
not clear how to measure the goodness of fit.
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example, and as seen in the empirical part of this paper, the observed unequalizing 
effect in the conditional quantile regression might be enhanced if it takes place over 
an already unequal distribution of education, or dampened if increases in education 
result in a more equal distribution of education.
3. EXPLORING THE DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF EDUCATION: 
 ARGENTINA 1992-2008
The analysis is based on micro data from Argentina’s Permanent Household Survey 
(EPH) for years 1992, 1998, and 2008, for all regions available in the period under 
analysis. The cities included are: Greater La Plata, Greater Santa Fe, Greater Paraná, 
Comodoro Rivadavia - Rada Tilly, Greater Córdoba, Neuquén - Plottier Santiago 
del Estero - La Banda, Jujuy - Palpalá, Rio Gallegos, Salta, San Luis - El Chorrillo, 
Greater San Juan, Santa Rosa - Toay, Ushuaia - Rio Grande, Buenos Aires City and 
Greater Buenos Aires. The sample considered is composed of men between 15 and 
65 years old. Income is defined as the salary obtained in all occupations measured in 
pesos as of December 2008.
Inequality, poverty and other aspects of the distribution of income changed 
dramatically in the last twenty years. Even though the nineties started with a period of 
sustained GDP growth, the same decade witnessed a monotonic increase in inequality 
and poverty. The drastic crisis experienced by Argentina in 2002 led to historic records 
in these measures. After that, a period of recovery followed, and inequality and poverty 
decreased at a monotonic rate, reaching, in 2008, levels similar to those observed at 
the beginning of the nineties. The three periods chosen for the analysis (1992, 1998 
and 2008) are representative of this behavior. For example, the Gini coefficient of 
hourly wages (see Table 3.1) started in 40.5, increased to 44 in 1998, and after 2001 
a period of sustained decline started and reached 39.8 in 2008. See Gasparini and 
Cruces (2009) and Sosa Escudero and Petralia (2012) for a complete description of 
these evolutions.
Changes in education were also dramatic in the period under analysis. Schooling, 
as measured by years of education increased from 9.9 in 1992 to 10.8 in 2008, as can 
be seen in Table 3.1. A clearer picture is obtained when looking at educational levels. 
For example, the proportion of individuals whose maximum level of education is 
complete primary dropped from 30.3% in 1992 to 19.4% in 2008. Similarly, the same 
proportion for complete high school rose from 16.4% to 22.4% during the same period. 
Educational levels increased monotonically, with most of the action taking place in 
the center of the distribution (around complete high school). If we split the sample by 
age groups (16 to 24, 25 to 40 and 41 to 64 years old) and educational level, a simple 
way of analyzing the evolution of wage inequality is through a decomposition of the 
Theil index by group. Table 3.2 shows that between 1992 and 2008 wage inequality 
between groups declined but within the interior of each group the inequality increased, 
thus giving a small increase in overall inequality. Moreover, looking at the changes 
by period, the main component in the change of inequality both during the increase 
in inequality in the nineties and the decline in the first decade after year 2000 was 
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TABLE 3.1
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SURVEY DATA. ARGENTINA 1992-2008
SAMPLE: MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
Year
Variable
Hourly wage
Mean Gini
Quantile 
0.10
Median
Quantile 
0.90
Range 
90-10
1992 11.5 40.5 4.1 8.2 21.6 17.5
1998 12.6 44.0 3.8 8.6 25.7 21.9
2008 11.4 39.8 3.6 8.7 21.1 17.5
Year
Age
Mean Std. Dev.
Quantile 
0.10
Median
Quantile 
0.90
Range 
90-10
1992 36.6 13.1 20 36 56 36
1998 37.4 12.3 22 36 55 33
2008 36.5 13.6 19 35 56 37
Year
Year of education
Mean Gini
Quantile 
0.10
Median
Quantile 
0.90
Range 
90-10
1992 9.9 21.1 7 10 15 8
1998 10.0 20.9 7 10 16 9
2008 10.8 19.2 7 12 16 9
Year
Educational Level
Primary 
incomplete
Primary 
complete
Dropouts Highschool
College 
incomplete
College 
complete
1992 9.3% 30.3% 24.5% 16.4% 11.4% 8.1%
1998 7.6% 27.4% 24.7% 18.0% 11.4% 10.7%
2008 6.9% 19.4% 23.8% 22.4% 14.8% 12.7%
Year
Region
GBA Pampa Cuyo NOA Patagonia Total
1992 65.9% 20.7% 3.5% 6.2% 3.7% 100%
1998 73.8% 14.4% 3.2% 5.2% 3.4% 100%
2008 70.7% 16.6% 3.3% 6.0% 3.4% 100%
Source:  Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC).
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basically led by the change in inequality ‘within’ (roughly 80% in the 90’s and 65% in 
the 00’s). These changes of the overall distribution can be more drastically appreciated 
in Figure 3.1, which shows the estimated densities of education for the three periods.
TABLE 3.2
THEIL GROUP DECOMPOSITION
SAMPLE: MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
Overall Within Between
Level
1992 31.76 29.98 1.78
1998 36.83 34.11 2.72
2008 32.52 31.32 1.20
Annual change
92-98 0.85 0.69 0.16
98-08 –0.43 –0.28 –0.15
92-08 0.05 0.08 0.04
Source: Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC).
FIGURE 3.1
WAGE MARGINAL DISTRIBUTION. ARGENTINA 1992 -2008
SAMPLE: MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
–2 0 2 4 6
1992 1998 2008
D
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Source:  Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC).
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In light of these results, it is natural to explore the interaction between changes 
in the distribution of education along with those in the distribution of income. As a 
motivation, in Table 3.3 we show (log) wage dispersion by group of educational level. 
As can be seen, inequality is increasing in educational level, although we control 
for the effect in the means of the remaining covariates. Therefore, it is clear that 
studying the wage distribution along with education only through the conditional mean 
(OLS) gives an incomplete picture of the distributive effects of education. Gasparini, 
Marchionni, and Sosa Escudero (2004) explore this link using a microeconometric 
decomposition frame-work, and conclude that education had equalizing effect in the 
period 1989-1992, and an unequalizing effect for 1992-1998. Bustelo (2004) adopts 
the approach of Mata and Machado (2005), that estimates a conditional quantile 
regression model from which, through simulations, a counterfactual unconditional 
distribution is obtained, and finds that that an increase in education is associated with 
a decrease in poverty, and a small unequalizing effect in the period 1992-2001, with 
a stronger effect for higher levels of education. Alejo (2006) explores the statistical 
significance of all these results. With Chilean data, some exercises along these lines 
can be found in Behrman (2011) and Ruiz Tagle (2007)2.
TABLE 3.3
VARIANCE OF LOG-WAGES, BY EDUCATION LEVEL
SAMPLE: MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
Primary 
incomplete
Primary 
complete
Secondary 
incomplete
Secondary 
complete
College 
incomplete
College 
complete
Without controls
1992 0.328 0.299 0.362 0.420 0.461 0.554
1998 0.417 0.375 0.401 0.463 0.424 0.564
2008 0.454 0.421 0.476 0.412 0.408 0.494
Controling for remaining covariates (1)
1992 0.322 0.263 0.313 0.355 0.403 0.505
1998 0.400 0.343 0.341 0.400 0.368 0.486
2008 0.406 0.383 0.415 0.375 0.371 0.467
Source: Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC).
Note:
(1) Log-wages net from the effect of other regressors (OLS). Covariates are: age, marital status and regional 
dummies.
As discussed in the previous section, we estimate RIF regressions for several 
unconditional quantiles, using a linear probability specification. We also estimate a 
2 We thank a referee for pointing out this connection. 
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RIF regression for the Gini coefficient. We use the usual covariates in standard Mincer 
equations, namely: age, years of education, marital status and dummy variables to 
control for regional effects.
As a previous step, Table 3.4 presents a conditional quantile regression analysis 
for quantiles ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. The last column of this Table presents results 
of a standard OLS regression. Tables 3.5 present results based on unconditional 
quantile regressions, and the last columns show results for the RIF regression of the 
Gini coefficient. For convenience, estimated coefficients for these two tables are 
represented in the first row of graphics in Figure 3.2.
Consider the first graph of Figure 3.2, which represents the estimated coefficients 
of years education, for the conditional and unconditional quantile regressions 
in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, for 1992. The horizontal line represents the ‘mean’ effect 
associated to the standard OLS estimator; 0.084, in this case. Were education set 
exogenously, this implies that an extra year of education led to an increase of around 
8.4% in expected wages. The solid line with triangles represent conditional quantile 
regression estimates, and the solid line (with no ticks), represents estimates for 
unconditional quantiles.
A first interesting fact is that, consistently with most previous results, effects are 
heterogeneous and increasing along the quantiles. CQR results suggest that effects range 
from 0.063 for the first decile to 0.095 to the 9th decile of the conditional distribution 
of wages. As stressed in the Introduction, this result must be interpreted carefully. It 
only suggests that after controlling for the covariates, all quantiles of the conditional 
distribution increase when education is enhanced, but at an increasing rate for the 
higher the quantiles. A common difficulty associated with the interpretation of these 
results is that the top (bottom) of the conditional distribution does not coincide with the 
top (bottom) of its unconditional counterpart. That is, the positive and heterogeneous 
CQR effects do not imply that education has a stronger effect for the, say, rich, but for 
the conditionally rich, that is, after controlling for all covariates. Consequently, in the 
CQR it is difficult to see if this unequalizing effect translates into the unconditional 
distribution of incomes, hence the usefulness of the UQR approach that studies this 
effect directly on the distribution of income.
Interestingly, UQR results show an even more pronounced heterogeneous behavior, 
the effect ranging from 0.046 to 0.140. UQR results are more directly interpretable 
since now they truly suggest that the effect of education is stronger for the rich. 
Differences between the CQR and the UQR approach might be due to the fact that 
the originally unequalizing effect of the CQR is further enhanced by applying it to 
the already unequal (and markedly asymmetric) distribution of education of 1992. As 
stressed in the previous sections, and unlike CQR, UQR integrates the heterogeneous 
effects on the conditional distribution with the existing levels of education, leading 
to an enhanced heterogeneous effect.
Finally, RIF regressions results for the Gini coefficient (last column of Table 3.5) 
are interesting. First, in order to obtain comparable results, the regression is estimated 
using levels of wages, not logs as in standard Mincer equations. Hence, results suggest 
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TABLE 3.4
MARGINAL EFFECTS ON CONDITIONAL WAGE DISTRIBUTION
QUANTILE REGRESSION - MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
Argentina 1992
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Mean
Age 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.010
(3.29)** (6.67)** (7.07)** (11.59)** (10.65)** (11.79)** (11.19)** (12.10)** (9.00)** (20.33)**
Years of education 0.063 0.065 0.071 0.076 0.079 0.086 0.089 0.093 0.095 0.084
(16.46)** (24.55)** (22.87)** (33.80)** (28.00)** (28.84)** (25.06)** (22.21)** (16.09)** (59.12)**
Married 0.154 0.173 0.175 0.157 0.181 0.168 0.196 0.159 0.153 0.180
(3.88)** (6.62)** (5.84)** (7.38)** (6.96)** (6.24)** (6.23)** (4.47)** (3.19)** (13.52)**
Region 2 (Pampa) –0.208 –0.214 –0.208 –0.227 –0.239 –0.253 –0.265 –0.274 –0.292 –0.241
(7.62)** (11.52)** (9.60)** (14.86)** (12.75)** (13.07)** (11.71)** (10.82)** (8.51)** (16.53)**
Region 3 (Cuyo) –0.472 –0.427 –0.424 –0.446 –0.470 –0.464 –0.468 –0.472 –0.529 –0.461
(13.62)** (18.43)** (15.88)** (23.85)** (20.59)** (19.83)** (17.29)** (15.64)** (13.11)** (14.27)**
Region 4 (NOA) –0.476 –0.409 –0.397 –0.402 –0.423 –0.419 –0.421 –0.429 –0.462 –0.430
(16.95)** (21.60)** (18.03)** (25.91)** (22.21)** (21.33)** (18.32)** (16.63)** (13.27)** (17.02)**
Region 5 (Patagonia) –0.031 0.055 0.093 0.112 0.126 0.138 0.146 0.133 0.109 0.088
(1.08) (2.84)** (4.13)** (7.12)** (6.54)** (7.00)** (6.38)** (5.26)** (3.21)** (2.86)**
Constant –0.525 –0.411 –0.372 –0.314 –0.258 –0.220 –0.160 –0.065 0.200 –0.256
(7.86)** (9.22)** (7.05)** (8.30)** (5.51)** (4.52)** (2.78)** –0.97 (2.11)* (10.99)**
Sample size 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196
Argentina 1998
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Mean
Age 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.013
(2.71)** (5.75)** (9.76)** (14.20)** (14.69)** (16.40)** (19.68)** (16.16)** (12.90)** (24.84)**
Years of education 0.091 0.090 0.096 0.100 0.100 0.102 0.107 0.111 0.113 0.104
(23.77)** (29.63)** (32.78)** (37.58)** (34.87)** (34.93)** (35.89)** (26.70)** (19.05)** (66.76)**
Married 0.204 0.162 0.124 0.106 0.098 0.122 0.128 0.121 0.066 0.116
(5.37)** (5.44)** (4.41)** (4.23)** (3.78)** (4.78)** (5.16)** (3.60)** (1.41) (8.21)**
Region 2 (Pampa) –0.226 –0.208 –0.221 –0.217 –0.228 –0.239 –0.235 –0.243 –0.252 –0.230
(7.11)** (8.22)** (9.40)** (10.48)** (10.65)** (11.41)** (11.63)** (9.07)** (6.69)** (13.61)**
Region 3 (Cuyo) –0.370 –0.325 –0.339 –0.337 –0.359 –0.378 –0.395 –0.424 –0.382 –0.361
(10.66)** (11.95)** (13.24)** (14.96)** (15.39)** (16.64)** (18.10)** (14.67)** (9.32)** (10.73)**
Region 4 (NOA) –0.529 –0.471 –0.458 –0.456 –0.462 –0.482 –0.474 –0.475 –0.472 –0.475
(15.64)** (17.80)** (18.52)** (20.93)** (20.53)** (21.92)** (22.38)** (16.97)** (12.11)** (17.88)**
Region 5 (Patagonia) 0.013 0.026 0.025 0.052 0.062 0.091 0.091 0.111 0.148 0.064
(0.39) (1.01) (1.05) (2.47)* (2.89)** (4.38)** (4.62)** (4.31)** (4.16)** (1.99)*
Constant –0.693 –0.495 –0.485 –0.468 –0.347 –0.286 –0.277 –0.179 0.036 –0.359
(9.42)** (8.87)** (9.40)** (10.29)** (7.32)** (6.11)** (5.96)** (2.84)** (0.40) (14.09)**
Sample size 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228
Argentina 2008
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Mean
Age 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.009
(3.84)** (6.49)** (8.39)** (12.78)** (13.93)** (14.27)** (21.44)** (13.80)** (14.48)** (20.31)**
Years of education 0.082 0.081 0.080 0.079 0.078 0.080 0.082 0.086 0.084 0.080
(22.06)** (28.21)** (29.39)** (38.77)** (34.52)** (30.96)** (39.96)** (23.50)** (21.50)** (57.67)**
Married 0.183 0.123 0.093 0.096 0.080 0.060 0.056 0.055 0.027 0.102
(5.19)** (4.76)** (3.89)** (5.50)** (4.19)** (2.88)** (3.47)** (1.96)* (0.92) (8.40)**
Region 2 (Pampa) –0.163 –0.102 –0.084 –0.085 –0.101 –0.103 –0.089 –0.125 –0.118 –0.109
(5.23)** (4.44)** (3.94)** (5.42)** (5.95)** (5.53)** (6.19)** (5.16)** (4.64)** (7.51)**
Region 3 (Cuyo) –0.386 –0.331 –0.294 –0.312 –0.308 –0.324 –0.311 –0.306 –0.338 –0.336
(9.99)** (11.28)** (10.77)** (15.35)** (13.92)** (13.35)** (16.81)** (9.65)** (10.65)** (11.18)**
Region 4 (NOA) –0.723 –0.619 –0.554 –0.558 –0.536 –0.500 –0.475 –0.465 –0.452 –0.543
(20.96)** (24.31)** (23.35)** (32.35)** (28.66)** (24.42)** (30.44)** (17.43)** (16.36)** (23.46)**
Region 5 (Patagonia) 0.252 0.318 0.348 0.334 0.361 0.365 0.383 0.407 0.434 0.351
(7.41)** (12.60)** (14.98)** (19.92)** (20.03)** (18.70)** (26.09)** (16.46)** (16.95)** (12.07)**
Constant 0.270 0.537 0.693 0.835 0.930 1.028 1.085 1.182 1.431 0.896
(3.71)** (10.07)** (14.17)** (23.31)** (23.76)** (23.82)** (32.41)** (20.51)** (23.59)** (37.09)**
Sample size 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580
Source:  Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC).
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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that shifting the distribution of education marginally, leads to an unequalizing increase 
of 1.83 points in the Gini coefficient3. It is interesting to remark that, qualitatively 
and quantitatively, these results are in agreement with those found by alternative 
methods (Gasparini, Marchionni, and Sosa Escudero (2004) and Bustelo (2004)). 
A major advantage of UQR is that the result is obtained using a single cross section 
for a given period, like in standard Mincer analysis, and unlike microeconometric 
decompositions that require either two periods or the construction of counterfactual 
distributions by simulation as in Mata and Machado (2005).
We then explore these effects for the remaining two periods (1998 and 2002). First, 
in 1998 all effects increase, for example, the mean effect moves from 0.084 in 1992 to 
0.104 in 1998. Interestingly, the CQR results, though still positive and increasing along 
the quantiles of the conditional distribution, are less disperse, now with a difference 
of less than 0.02 points between the 0.1 and the 0.9 decile, suggesting a decreasing 
unequalizing effect. On the contrary, UQR results are markedly more heterogeneous, 
ranging from 0.066 to 0.19 along the quantiles of the unconditional distribution of 
wages, suggesting a strong unequalizing effect of education through this channel. This 
coincides with the beginning of the worst part of the performance in inequality in the 
period under analysis. This effect is further confirmed by the corresponding coefficient 
for education in the RIF regression for the Gini coefficient, which now leads to an 
increase of almost 2 points. It is important to remark that beyond the qualitative or 
statistical relevance of this figure, in economic terms, 2 points along the Gini coefficient 
of Argentina is an economically large figure, mostly from the perspective that the 
swings in inequality in the period under analysis range around 4 points.
The year 2008 presents a completely different picture. The levels of the effects 
are now similar to those of 1992, but the heterogeneity reduces drastically, as can be 
seen in the third graph of the first row of Figure 3.2. Now CQR effects stay rather 
stable around the mean effect (0.08), while UQR effects now range from 0.063 to 
0.11. The effect of education on the Gini index is still unequalizing, but considerably 
smaller (0.49 in 2008).
Next we compute results measuring education by maximum levels of achievement, 
in order to allow for ‘sheepskin effects’ (Hungerford and Solon (1987)). To this purpose 
we run the same regressions as before but now replacing years of education with binary 
variables indicating the highest level of education reached by the individual. The results 
(OLS and QR) for the conditional distribution are reported in Table 3.6. Table 3.7 
shows the results for the unconditional distribution (RIF-regressions). Given that we 
are dealing with binary regressors, it is common practice to interpret the estimations 
as the effect of finishing a certain level of education. However, the interpretation of the 
3 We are not simulating a policy exercise here, since that is not possible with these tools. The nature of 
changes in education distribution analyzed in this paper (small location shifts) can be considered as 
a simple exercise compared to a real educational policy seeking to improve human capital. However, 
our exercise can contribute to shed light about the effects on inequality of a certain policy that changes 
slightly the level of education from its status quo in order to improve human capital.
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TABLE 3.5
MARGINAL EFFECTS ON MARGINAL WAGE DISTRIBUTION
RIF REGRESSION - MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
Argentina 1992
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Gini
Indicator 4.64 5.81 6.83 7.89 9.32 10.92 13.26 17.06 24.52 40.5
Marginal Effects
Age 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.14
(1) (3.16)** (5.69)** (7.54)** (8.77)** (8.37)** (10.12)** (9.59)** (8.43)** (6.89)** (3.86)**
(2) (7.58)** (10.40)** (14.25)** (17.08)** (18.88)** (18.93)** (18.03)** (16.23)** (14.47)** (9.47)**
Years of education 0.046 0.047 0.054 0.065 0.075 0.087 0.107 0.119 0.140 1.83
(1) (13.23)** (17.39)** (20.81)** (23.46)** (24.44)** (25.81)** (27.15)** (23.58)** (15.89)** (17.07)**
(2) (18.14)** (24.67)** (27.98)** (29.76)** (31.16)** (31.13)** (28.95)** (27.60)** (21.11)** (19.30)**
Married 0.149 0.168 0.142 0.134 0.170 0.172 0.213 0.205 0.197 2.05
(1) (4.02)** (5.85)** (5.18)** (4.58)** (5.44)** (5.14)** (5.68)** (4.70)** (3.22)** (2.03)*
(2) (9.81)** (11.91)** (13.11)** (13.47)** (12.27)** (12.94)** (12.69)** (10.86)** (7.96)** (12.76)**
Region 2 (Pampa) –0.244 –0.213 –0.216 –0.236 –0.253 –0.256 –0.255 –0.260 –0.268 –0.76
(1) (8.99)** (10.28)** (11.03)** (11.55)** (11.53)** (10.94)** (9.64)** (8.55)** (6.16)** (0.68)
(2) (7.47)** (10.56)** (11.99)** (11.23)** (10.56)** (9.72)** (9.42)** (8.72)** (7.13)** (9.62)**
Region 3 (Cuyo) –0.667 –0.550 –0.469 –0.453 –0.428 –0.414 –0.394 –0.386 –0.341 5.85
(1) (14.98)** (19.06)** (18.89)** (18.70)** (16.98)** (16.08)** (13.90)** (12.64)** (8.11)** (2.38)*
(2) (10.98)** (14.14)** (15.92)** (16.59)** (15.98)** (14.52)** (14.09)** (11.84)** (9.37)** (14.18)**
Region 4 (NOA) –0.614 –0.467 –0.423 –0.398 –0.398 –0.368 –0.366 –0.344 –0.337 4.11
(1) (18.43)** (20.27)** (20.44)** (18.95)** (18.25)** (16.05)** (14.62)** (12.26)** (8.78)** (2.14)*
(2) (13.95)** (17.06)** (18.96)** (18.42)** (17.98)** (16.29)** (14.18)** (13.21)** (9.86)** (17.85)**
Region 5 (Patagonia) –0.045 0.022 0.067 0.113 0.131 0.163 0.191 0.219 0.125 –0.18
(1) (1.65) (1.08) (3.37)** (5.32)** (5.64)** (6.53)** (6.77)** (6.72)** (2.78)** (0.08)
(2) (0.18) (2.17)* (3.74)** (7.13)** (7.66)** (9.41)** (9.56)** (8.38)** (5.84)** (1.51)
Constant –0.407 –0.272 –0.214 –0.245 –0.221 –0.293 –0.343 –0.202 –0.165 0.15
(1) (5.74)** (5.04)** (4.27)** (4.78)** (4.12)** (5.30)** (5.96)** (2.94)** (1.49) (8.66)**
(2) (13.36)** (11.75)** (10.00)** (8.38)** (7.81)** (7.21)** (5.82)** (1.55) (0.19) (35.45)**
Sample size 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196
Argentina 1998
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Gini
Indicator 4.29 5.66 6.9 8.08 9.73 11.66 14.14 18.28 29.16 44.0
Marginal Effects
Age 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.024 0.35
(1) (2.74)** (5.87)** (8.42)** (9.38)** (10.21)** (11.61)** (12.60)** (12.19)** (9.51)** (9.23)**
(2) (6.98)** (11.46)** (15.58)** (16.82)** (18.28)** (20.04)** (19.59)** (19.11)** (14.73)** (7.86)**
Years of education 0.066 0.059 0.070 0.079 0.090 0.104 0.124 0.148 0.190 1.99
(1) (14.50)** (19.87)** (24.91)** (29.23)** (31.53)** (33.87)** (35.15)** (30.45)** (20.08)** (18.02)**
(2) (18.33)** (21.89)** (28.12)** (31.35)** (32.97)** (31.18)** (31.31)** (27.74)** (19.75)** (15.56)**
Married 0.238 0.144 0.112 0.120 0.117 0.104 0.072 0.108 0.063 –4.00
(1) (5.34)** (4.78)** (3.86)** (4.22)** (3.93)** (3.38)** (2.12)* (2.65)** (0.97) (3.99)**
(2) (7.04)** (8.86)** (9.49)** (9.69)** (9.29)** (9.05)** (8.30)** (6.29)** (2.92)** (10.01)**
Region 2 (Pampa) –0.143 –0.155 –0.192 –0.219 –0.228 –0.235 –0.243 –0.261 –0.421 –4.25
(1) (3.99)** (6.16)** (7.94)** (9.46)** (9.50)** (9.49)** (8.81)** (7.79)** (8.54)** (3.55)**
(2) (3.96)** (6.60)** (8.62)** (10.11)** (10.34)** (9.45)** (9.30)** (8.48)** (8.36)** (4.21)**
Region 3 (Cuyo) –0.501 –0.365 –0.391 –0.379 –0.371 –0.331 –0.304 –0.292 –0.355 2.08
(1) (10.26)** (12.17)** (14.53)** (15.25)** (14.75)** (12.98)** (11.00)** (8.87)** (7.22)** (0.88)
(2) (8.68)** (11.17)** (13.20)** (15.27)** (13.62)** (13.77)** (13.39)** (10.44)** (7.48)** (10.41)**
Region 4 (NOA) –0.794 –0.545 –0.520 –0.436 –0.432 –0.411 –0.372 –0.343 –0.453 3.42
(1) (15.86)** (18.51)** (20.11)** (18.23)** (17.92)** (17.06)** (14.19)** (10.96)** (10.02)** (1.82)
(2) (12.29)** (16.83)** (17.56)** (18.50)** (15.47)** (15.63)** (13.87)** (11.60)** (9.76)** (14.35)**
Region 5 (Patagonia) 0.007 0.018 0.028 0.064 0.082 0.097 0.128 0.137 0.059 0.10
(1) (0.19) (0.73) (1.14) (2.71)** (3.27)** (3.72)** (4.44)** (4.05)** (1.18) (0.04)
(2) (2.25)* (3.35)** (4.57)** (5.52)** (7.19)** (8.10)** (9.15)** (8.40)** (5.20)** (2.20)*
Constant –0.597 –0.278 –0.265 –0.237 –0.200 –0.239 –0.339 –0.435 –0.527 0.14
(1) (6.48)** (4.62)** (4.85)** (4.74)** (3.98)** (4.89)** (6.45)** (6.62)** (4.30)** (7.73)**
(2) (10.91)** (7.40)** (8.46)** (7.26)** (7.30)** (5.90)** (4.53)** (4.54)** –1.48 (32.37)**
Sample size 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228 11,228
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marginal effect is slightly different when it comes to RIF-regressions. As an example, 
if we pick the variable that indicates if the individual finished primary school (i.e. takes 
on the value of 1 for such individuals), the estimated coefficient of a RIF-regression 
measures the distributive effect of a small increase in the proportion of people in 
that educational level (see Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007b)). Results are shown 
graphically as before, in the 2nd to 4th row of graphs in Figure 3.2.
Primary school has a positive but homogeneous effect on both the conditional 
and unconditional distribution of income, along the whole period. Moreover, as 
measured by the RIF/Gini regression, this step induces an overall equalizing effect of 
education on the distribution of income. When moving to other levels of educational 
achievement, the heterogeneity starts to increase and now follows a pattern closer to 
that found when measuring education in years: heterogeneity is important but dampens 
in 2008. Also, it is interesting to see that higher education (as compared to the base 
category), shows a highly heterogeneous performance that peaked in 1998, coinciding 
with the period where inequality peaked in Argentina, suggesting that education had 
a markedly different effect which fueled inequality up.
Table 3.5 (Continuation)
Argentina 2008
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Gini
Indicator 3.62 4.97 6.21 7.37 8.69 10.14 12.28 15.35 21.12 39.8
Marginal Effects
Age 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.18
(1) (2.87)** (5.68)** (8.50)** (10.76)** (12.44)** (13.23)** (13.24)** (12.65)** (10.18)** (3.39)**
(2) (5.93)** (8.96)** (13.48)** (15.58)** (17.21)** (19.10)** (18.45)** (15.21)** (13.86)** (2.13)*
Years of education 0.063 0.071 0.072 0.076 0.077 0.082 0.087 0.097 0.110 0.49
(1) (13.46)** (21.14)** (26.65)** (31.17)** (33.46)** (33.71)** (31.84)** (26.63)** (19.25)** (3.04)**
(2) (17.69)** (24.69)** (28.25)** (32.46)** (33.09)** (34.03)** (31.90)** (27.95)** (23.13)** (14.00)**
Married 0.276 0.136 0.071 0.070 0.066 0.062 0.054 0.010 0.046 –0.56
(1) (6.52)** (4.69)** (2.97)** (3.14)** (3.06)** (2.76)** (2.24)* (0.36) (1.19) (0.40)
(2) (8.26)** (8.42)** (7.26)** (6.75)** (5.98)** (6.02)** (5.60)** (4.61)** (2.79)** (7.28)**
Region 2 (Pampa) –0.114 –0.087 –0.118 –0.112 –0.096 –0.094 –0.091 –0.090 –0.162 –2.50
(1) (3.21)** (3.47)** (5.51)** (5.65)** (4.94)** (4.65)** (4.19)** (3.44)** (4.61)** (1.49)
(2) (2.67)** (3.25)** (4.53)** (4.94)** (4.95)** (4.66)** (3.33)** (3.77)** (3.53)** (1.78)
Region 3 (Cuyo) –0.430 –0.420 –0.372 –0.305 –0.289 –0.284 –0.312 –0.292 –0.311 1.14
(1) (7.94)** (11.27)** (12.64)** (11.63)** (11.86)** (11.64)** (12.74)** (10.67)** (9.28)** (0.33)
(2) (8.11)** (12.50)** (13.86)** (14.20)** (13.30)** (13.18)** (11.24)** (10.85)** (8.59)** (9.00)**
Region 4 (NOA) –1.000 –0.714 –0.587 –0.484 –0.431 –0.385 –0.371 –0.354 –0.336 7.66
(1) (18.56)** (22.25)** (23.99)** (22.78)** (21.89)** (19.55)** (18.39)** (15.44)** (11.21)** (2.87)**
(2) (16.12)** (20.64)** (21.37)** (21.79)** (22.18)** (20.10)** (17.06)** (15.74)** (11.32)** (18.43)**
Region 5 (Patagonia) 0.173 0.241 0.260 0.311 0.336 0.405 0.428 0.510 0.554 3.70
(1) (5.36)** (10.23)** (12.48)** (15.39)** (16.28)** (18.33)** (17.30)** (16.19)** (12.39)** (1.10)
(2) (7.44)** (12.33)** (15.90)** (19.56)** (20.79)** (21.28)** (20.27)** (17.99)** (14.82)** (0.36)
Constant 0.330 0.558 0.753 0.823 0.924 0.999 1.131 1.182 1.291 0.28
(1) (3.43)** (8.68)** (14.75)** (18.43)** (22.81)** (24.40)** (25.84)** (21.30)** (16.51)** (9.91)**
(2) (3.84)** (10.60)** (14.86)** (19.83)** (24.76)** (26.70)** (27.16)** (27.60)** (26.65)** (33.23)**
Sample size 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580 14,580
Source:  Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC). 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Indicator refers 
to the functional (quantiles, Gini, etc.). (1) Standard Errors computed by rifreg.ado. (2) Standard 
Errors computed by a 1000 resampling bootstrap.
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TABLE 3.6
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON CONDITIONAL WAGE DISTRIBUTION
QUANTILE REGRESSION - MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
Argentina 1992
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Media
Primary complete 0.266 0.223 0.190 0.188 0.179 0.152 0.116 0.143 0.164 0.21
(5.67)** (5.79)** (6.28)** (5.58)** (4.31)** (3.44)** (2.18)* (3.17)** (2.63)** (9.83)**
Secondary incomplete 0.353 0.319 0.304 0.338 0.310 0.312 0.308 0.362 0.401 0.36
(7.09)** (7.90)** (9.55)** (9.57)** (7.09)** (6.69)** (5.48)** (7.48)** (5.98)** (16.31)**
Secondary complete 0.499 0.492 0.496 0.539 0.551 0.589 0.610 0.633 0.635 0.59
(9.69)** (11.76)** (15.02)** (14.67)** (12.08)** (12.13)** (10.41)** (12.60)** (9.05)** (25.77)**
College incomplete 0.640 0.669 0.694 0.757 0.758 0.798 0.806 0.892 0.956 0.81
(10.68)** (13.97)** (18.35)** (17.90)** (14.38)** (14.15)** (11.81)** (15.31)** (11.99)** (31.00)**
College complete 0.968 1.019 1.052 1.098 1.079 1.130 1.224 1.282 1.465 1.18
(16.10)** (20.77)** (26.78)** (25.15)** (19.96)** (19.70)** (17.71)** (21.73)** (17.73)** (44.48)**
Sample size 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618
Argentina 1998
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Media
Primary complete 0.212 0.137 0.185 0.148 0.142 0.166 0.215 0.230 0.213 0.19
(3.40)** (2.93)** (3.99)** (3.68)** (3.89)** (3.95)** (5.42)** (5.00)** (2.96)** (8.02)**
Secondary incomplete 0.371 0.270 0.298 0.291 0.307 0.354 0.389 0.406 0.384 0.36
(5.90)** (5.65)** (6.26)** (7.06)** (8.24)** (8.18)** (9.51)** (8.49)** (5.10)** (14.94)**
Secondary complete 0.611 0.475 0.538 0.520 0.535 0.591 0.630 0.676 0.753 0.61
(9.40)** (9.63)** (11.00)** (12.26)** (13.90)** (13.22)** (14.94)** (13.74)** (9.72)** (24.42)**
College incomplete 0.936 0.780 0.888 0.886 0.880 0.902 0.942 0.994 1.016 0.93
(13.20)** (14.39)** (16.53)** (18.94)** (20.68)** (18.19)** (20.13)** (18.14)** (11.69)** (33.66)**
College complete 1.300 1.217 1.301 1.286 1.350 1.468 1.533 1.542 1.535 1.42
(18.38)** (22.69)** (24.26)** (27.51)** (31.68)** (29.44)** (32.33)** (27.92)** (17.62)** (51.67)**
Sample size 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231
Argentina 2008
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Media
Primary complete 0.212 0.156 0.134 0.122 0.137 0.186 0.190 0.220 0.195 0.19
(3.11)** (4.06)** (2.93)** (2.87)** (3.27)** (3.94)** (4.63)** (5.18)** (3.68)** (8.14)**
Secondary incomplete 0.238 0.215 0.227 0.245 0.262 0.345 0.348 0.366 0.350 0.30
(3.41)** (5.55)** (4.94)** (5.71)** (6.21)** (7.22)** (8.40)** (8.48)** (6.46)** (12.38)**
Secondary complete 0.527 0.511 0.469 0.437 0.450 0.505 0.523 0.567 0.536 0.52
(7.80)** (13.64)** (10.51)** (10.49)** (10.96)** (10.92)** (13.03)** (13.57)** (10.12)** (22.07)**
College incomplete 0.825 0.787 0.743 0.702 0.706 0.759 0.790 0.860 0.848 0.79
(11.28)** (19.51)** (15.50)** (15.62)** (15.94)** (15.15)** (18.12)** (18.81)** (14.73)** (30.69)**
College complete 0.955 0.941 0.940 0.926 0.949 1.029 1.062 1.125 1.086 1.00
(13.48)** (23.94)** (20.13)** (21.20)** (22.03)** (21.13)** (24.97)** (25.31)** (19.37)** (40.24)**
Sample size 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608
Source:  Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC).
Note: Years old, marital status and regional dummies also was included in regression.
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TABLE 3.7
MARGINAL EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON UNCONDITIONAL WAGE DISTRIBUTION
RIF REGRESSION - MEN BETWEEN 16 AND 64 YEARS OLD
Argentina 1992
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Gini
Indicator 4.09 5.12 6.02 6.96 8.21 9.63 11.69 15.04 21.61 40.5
Marginal Effects
Primary complete 0.280 0.217 0.165 0.149 0.169 0.168 0.174 0.188 0.145 –3.26
(1) (4.10)** (4.29)** (3.52)** (3.13)** (3.49)** (3.47)** (3.72)** (4.55)** (2.95)** (2.06)*
(2) (6.35)** (7.48)** (8.00)** (8.34)** (8.28)** (7.69)** (7.39)** (5.27)** (5.44)** (4.69)**
Secondary incomplete 0.339 0.320 0.302 0.299 0.344 0.354 0.380 0.432 0.307 –2.10
(1) (4.83)** (6.15)** (6.28)** (5.99)** (6.73)** (6.80)** (7.28)** (8.47)** (5.02)** (1.26)
(2) (7.95)** (10.04)** (11.54)** (12.17)** (12.26)** (13.01)** (13.43)** (12.91)** (9.72)** (1.76)
Secondary complete 0.497 0.462 0.466 0.532 0.580 0.626 0.739 0.752 0.601 –1.42
(1) (7.27)** (9.09)** (9.81)** (10.78)** (11.09)** (11.47)** (12.79)** (12.36)** (7.30)** (0.82)
(2) (11.95)** (15.82)** (16.99)** (17.91)** (19.93)** (19.96)** (20.16)** (17.98)** (13.77)** (0.13)
College incomplete 0.600 0.577 0.613 0.685 0.786 0.875 0.981 1.078 1.108 2.071
(1) (8.54)** (10.84)** (12.42)** (12.79)** (13.63)** (13.92)** (14.01)** (13.14)** (8.79)** (1.06)
(2) (11.86)** (16.93)** (19.64)** (20.21)** (21.66)** (20.24)** (20.33)** (18.13)** (13.05)** (2.44)*
College complete 0.625 0.611 0.652 0.806 0.956 1.151 1.437 1.632 2.133 37.08
(1) (9.85)** (12.56)** (14.14)** (16.94)** (18.51)** (20.73)** (22.61)** (19.49)** (13.56)** (18.64)**
(2) (14.46)** (19.02)** (23.11)** (25.35)** (27.15)** (25.74)** (26.17)** (22.86)** (15.50)** (10.82)**
Sample size 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618 10,618
Argentina 1998
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Gini
Indicator 3.78 4.99 6.08 7.12 8.57 10.27 12.46 16.11 25.7 44.0
Marginal Effects
Primary complete 0.267 0.181 0.136 0.164 0.178 0.158 0.180 0.171 0.143 –1.30
(1) (2.76)** (2.97)** (2.43)* (3.19)** (3.49)** (3.28)** (3.87)** (3.87)** (2.87)** (0.78)
(2) (6.10)** (6.76)** (6.16)** (5.25)** (7.28)** (7.03)** (7.58)** (7.16)** (5.23)** (2.76)**
Secondary incomplete 0.437 0.302 0.308 0.322 0.322 0.342 0.350 0.377 0.332 –1.44
(1) (4.55)** (4.93)** (5.46)** (6.16)** (6.14)** (6.82)** (7.01)** (7.44)** (5.34)** (0.85)
(2) (7.76)** (9.36)** (9.57)** (10.37)** (12.50)** (11.85)** (12.61)** (12.05)** (7.77)** (3.95)**
Secondary complete 0.696 0.512 0.523 0.571 0.599 0.630 0.670 0.659 0.720 –3.15
(1) (7.57)** (8.56)** (9.38)** (10.86)** (11.12)** (11.79)** (11.98)** (10.86)** (8.40)** (1.79)
(2) (10.42)** (13.63)** (15.26)** (15.50)** (17.92)** (17.07)** (17.88)** (17.27)** (11.78)** (3.51)**
College incomplete 0.852 0.716 0.799 0.871 0.949 1.017 1.100 1.155 0.948 –2.47
(1) (9.02)** (11.84)** (14.26)** (16.15)** (16.78)** (17.44)** (16.89)** (14.71)** (8.40)** (1.29)
(2) (12.87)** (16.79)** (19.09)** (20.29)** (22.46)** (21.05)** (21.65)** (19.90)** (13.75)** (0.26)
College complete 0.819 0.714 0.825 0.959 1.127 1.332 1.653 2.054 2.870 37.62
(1) (9.06)** (12.59)** (15.79)** (19.76)** (22.73)** (26.86)** (29.97)** (27.95)** (19.15)** (19.62)**
(2) (14.16)** (18.13)** (22.63)** (25.28)** (29.14)** (27.13)** (28.91)** (26.31)** (18.71)** (11.07)**
Sample size 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231 11,231
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Table 3.7 (Continuation)
Argentina 2008
q(0.10) q(0.20) q(0.30) q(0.40) q(0.50) q(0.60) q(0.70) q(0.80) q(0.90) Gini
Indicator 3.62 4.97 6.21 7.37 8.69 10.14 12.28 15.35 21.12 39.8
Marginal Effects
Primary complete 0.247 0.213 0.195 0.212 0.187 0.157 0.138 0.097 0.083 –1.88
(1) (2.46)* (2.80)** (3.26)** (4.26)** (4.24)** (3.64)** (3.18)** (1.92) (2.15)* (0.69)
(2) (5.48)** (5.95)** (6.46)** (7.31)** (7.31)** (7.13)** (6.06)** (4.66)** (2.43)* (3.78)**
Secondary incomplete 0.257 0.330 0.305 0.350 0.320 0.308 0.288 0.233 0.224 –1.95
(1) (2.52)* (4.36)** (5.09)** (7.01)** (7.17)** (6.95)** (6.39)** (4.41)** (5.09)** (0.69)
(2) (6.38)** (7.64)** (8.91)** (10.78)** (10.48)** (10.58)** (9.81)** (8.39)** (5.74)** (3.72)**
Secondary complete 0.620 0.648 0.590 0.567 0.524 0.497 0.467 0.392 0.313 –3.04
(1) (6.48)** (9.00)** (10.30)** (11.81)** (12.10)** (11.52)** (10.54)** (7.44)** (6.90)** (1.12)
(2) (10.46)** (13.58)** (16.36)** (18.40)** (18.09)** (17.73)** (17.15)** (13.97)** (8.56)** (4.65)**
College incomplete 0.821 0.873 0.849 0.864 0.822 0.793 0.724 0.715 0.750 –5.70
(1) (8.44)** (12.13)** (14.77)** (17.53)** (17.93)** (16.71)** (14.32)** (11.43)** (10.40)** (1.92)
(2) (10.46)** (13.58)** (16.36)** (18.40)** (18.09)** (17.73)** (17.15)** (13.97)** (8.56)** (4.65)**
College complete 0.747 0.848 0.857 0.925 0.945 1.020 1.096 1.192 1.361 7.06
(1) (7.79)** (11.97)** (15.33)** (19.72)** (21.95)** (23.10)** (23.01)** (19.08)** (17.06)** (2.46)*
(2) (12.18)** (16.00)** (18.62)** (21.07)** (20.54)** (19.87)** (18.90)** (17.00)** (11.54)** (6.19)**
Sample size 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608 14,608
Source:  Own calculations based on EPH (INDEC).
Note:  Years old, marital status and regional dummies also was included in regression. Note: (1) Standard 
Errors computed by rifreg.ado, (2) Standard Errors computed by a 1000 resampling bootstrap.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Standard conditional quantile regression suggest an unequalizing effect of education 
on the within dispersion of education for cells of individuals with similar education and 
other observed covariates, as documented by Martins and Pereira (2004). This does 
not necessarily mean that education has an unequalizing effect on the unconditional 
distribution of earnings. To this purpose, this paper uses unconditional quantile 
regressions as a powerful tool to explore the effects of education on the distribution 
of earnings directly.
The case of Argentina is a very relevant one, in light of the drastic movements in 
its income distribution and of the improvements in terms of educational achievement. 
In line with existing results for several countries and periods (including Argentina), 
the conditional quantile regression results in this paper suggest the presence of an 
unequalizing effect of education through positive and heterogeneous returns, increasing 
along the quantiles of the conditional distribution, a particularly strong effect for the 
nineties. Our unconditional quantile regression results suggest that in the nineties these 
heterogeneous returns were further enhanced and co-moved positively with the observed 
increases in inequality, as measured by the Gini index. Interestingly, results for the 
year 2008 suggest that these unequalizing effects reduced dramatically, revitalizing the 
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role of education as a powerful policy variable to improve welfare. We think welfare 
as something affected by growth and inequality. That is, since education affects both 
the wage level (growth) and its distribution (inequality) in opposite directions, we find 
that the unequalizing effect becomes less strong. To summarize, the rapid increase in 
inequality in the nineties coincided with a period of increased education, particularly 
successful in moving individuals into high school, and a markedly heterogeneous 
performance in terms of how discrepancies in education were remunerated in the 
market. That is, in this period, the strong unequalizing effect of education is not due 
to increased education per-se, but on discrepancies in either quality of education, the 
way the market remunerates these discrepancies, and the interaction with abilities and 
their own remunerations. The results for the end of the nineties, suggest that this strong 
unequalizing effect has disappeared, reaffirming the relevant role fostering education 
has on improving welfare. Another relevant result, that reinforces the previous result, 
is that the channel that increases inequality through heterogeneity is almost absent 
when education increases at the lowest levels.
Finally, this paper refrains from exploring the effect of treating education as 
an endogenous variable. Unlike mean results, methods for handling such problem 
when the interest lies in distributive effects are still in their infancy (Powell (2011)), 
and, surely, are a top priority for further work. Nevertheless, it is relevant to remark 
that it is not clear ex-ante that the concerns that affect mean estimates translate into 
other functional alike. For example, when the interest lies in inequality, a biased 
counterfactual distribution that arises by ignoring endogeneities does not necessarily 
biased the functional of interest for distributive purposes. For example, if neglected 
endogeneities bias the whole conditional distribution up (or down), this affects negatively 
the estimation of the mean effect, but not necessarily that of distributive effects, which 
depend on distances between quantiles and not on their levels. A detailed exploration 
of these effects is a relevant route for further exploration, once reliable and ready to 
implement models and techniques become available.
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APPENDIX A: 
THE INFLUENCE FUNCTION
The influence function of ν at FY is given by
 IF y v y y dF y( , ) ( ) ( )  Yψ ψ ( )≡ − ∫  (1)
Intuitively, it measures the influence a single point y has on a particular functional. 
For example, for the mean, the influence function is given by y − μ.
It is important, to observe that
 E IF y v[ ( , )] 0=  (2)
APPENDIX B: 
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL AND RIF
If we assume the linear probability model Pr[Y>qτ | X = x] = x’β, trivially
 
d I Y q X x
dx
Pr[ ( ) | ]β = > =τ  (3)
Then, replacing in the result for the unconditional partial effect, for the case of 
quantiles we get
 c .1,α ν β( ) = τ  (4)
This leads to a very simple way to estimate these partial effects. Consider the 
regression model
 I y q x u( ) 'β> = +τ  (5)
Note that under the linear probability assumption, E(u|x) = 0. Now
 
I y q c c c c x u
c c x u
( ) '
'
1, 2, 2, 1,
2, 1,
*
β
β
> + = + +
+ +
τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ
 (6)
with β * ≡ c1,τ β  = α (ν). Then, if RIF(y, qτ) = I(y > qτ) c1,τ + c2,τ were observable, 
a regression of RIF(y,qτ) on x would provide a consistent estimate of β *
 = = α (ν).
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APPENDIX C: 
RECENTERED INFLUENCE FUNCTION FOR GINI INDEX
In this Appendix we follow Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007a). Let Y be a random 
variable distributed according to FY, then the Generalized Lorenz Curve is
 GL p F zdF z( , ) ( )Y
F
Y
Y p( )
1
∫=
−∞
−
 (7)
Define,
 R F GL p F dp( ) ( , )Y Y
0
1
∫=  (8)
Then, the RIF for the Gini Index evaluated at y is given by
 RIF y v B F C F( , ) 1 ( ) ( ),Y Y= + +  (9)
where
 B F R F( ) 2 ( )Y Y
2µ= −  (10)
 C y F y p y GL p y F( , ) 2 { [1 ( )] [ ( )( )]}Y Y
1µ= − +−  (11)
with μ = E(Y) and p(y) = FY (y), (see Monti (1991)).
The RIF estimation uses the sample analogs in the previous formula. Let 
y1 ≤ y2≤… ≤yn be the ordered sample observations, then we have the following
 p y
n
I y y( )
1
( )j ij
n
1
 ∑= ≤
=
 (12)
 ∑= ≤=GL p y n I y y y[ ( )]
1
( )i j ij
n
j1
 (13)
R(FY) is obtained by numeric integration of GL[p(yi)]. The next step is to replace each 
estimation in the previous formulas.
